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Abstract 
Last year, the authors presented Part 1, which focused on a discussion on 
policy/directives and then explored the efficacy of the DoD’s cybersecurity strategy and 
associated actions taken to date—all intended to safeguard the efficacy of DoD systems. 
The goal of the research in Part 2 is centered on the design and implementation of the 
cybersecurity training intended to achieve the key cybersecurity behaviors to meet that end. 
The Kirkpatrick Learning Level framework is used to help translate learning objectives into 
security and resilience critical behaviors for organizational oversight. The process of 
translating Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes (KSAs) into learning objectives and workplace 
behaviors is also discussed. However, what the workforce actually applies in the workplace 
is the most important part of the equation, especially its correlation to expected outcomes. 
Part 2 addresses just that. The DoD will be hard-pressed to achieve any mission assurance 
objectives for security and resilience without recognizing that (1) cybersecurity critical 
learning behaviors require commitment at all levels—individual, team, and organizational; 
and (2) cybersecurity must be viewed as more of a dilemma where emerging threats will 
surface continuously and must be assessed with regular frequency to ensure the viability of 
the DoD’s weapon systems’ lethality. 
Introduction 
In March 2019, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) released an extensive 
Cybersecurity Readiness Review. His uncomplimentary readiness review reinforced the 
findings of numerous other reports (e.g., reports by the Director National Intelligence [DNI]; 
Office of Management and Budget [OMB]; Government Accountability Office [GAO]; DoD 
Inspector General [IG]; Defense Science Board [DSB]; Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation [DOT&E]; and other government agencies, think tanks, etc.) that concluded a 
cyberattack by an advanced cyber threat could easily inflict significant mission impact to the 
DoD. Simply stated, the DoD (and perhaps other federal agencies) is (are) not achieving 
their required mission assurance outcomes for cybersecurity and cyber resiliency. The 
response to the quintessential question for DoD cyber risk management (i.e., can the DoD 
as a collective handle a co-evolving, intelligent cyber threat?) is not good. Almost every 
assessment of the DoD and its supporting infrastructure has reaffirmed that it is woefully 
unprepared for attacks from a cyber peer. Even worse, the DoD continues to fall further 
behind year after year, and that might come as a shock to those who would depend on the 
DoD to prevent a catastrophic event by a cyber peer. 
The DoD already has significant cybersecurity issues (i.e., Significant Mission 
Impact) and faces a learning culture with little understood obstacles, including the following: 
 
 Cybersecurity is a complex, dynamic, and ambiguous domain and is becoming a 
dilemma. 
 Cybersecurity Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes (KSAs) exist (e.g., Newhouse et 
al., 2017) but are only sporadically translated into critical learning behaviors. 
 The forgetting curve is no stranger to cybersecurity. Cybersecurity requires an 
ongoing commitment to a workplace learning environment for competencies to 
flourish. 
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 Formal (and tailored) training is only a learning antecedent. What the workforce 
actually applies (and practices) in the workplace with regular frequency is vitally 
important. 
 Reinforcement of the critical behaviors is dependent on leadership’s persistence 
to establish and maintain a strong learning culture. 
Given its complexity, domain ambiguity, and dynamic nature, cybersecurity cannot 
depend on incidental learning. While a lot of good work has been done with cybersecurity 
core knowledge and tasks (e.g., Newhouse et al., 2017), it has yet to be translated into the 
critical behaviors required to fully embody cybersecurity learning gains. Newhouse et al. 
(2017) has numerous applicable KSAs for most cybersecurity workers, and the KSAs can be 
easily translated into Bloom’s Taxonomy action verbs. However, using any learning 
application framework (e.g., Kirkpatrick or Brinkerhoff) to translate learning objectives into 
critical behaviors for organization oversight of security and resilience as far as their 
realization goes has not yet been implemented. The process of translating KSAs into 
learning objectives and behaviors is discussed with various representative groups. National 
Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) KSAs (Newhouse et al., 2017) have only 
connected learning objectives and behaviors described as follows: 
 K0106—Knowledge of what constitutes a network attack and a network attack’s 
relationship to both threats and vulnerabilities 
 K0110—Knowledge of adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures 
 K0112—Knowledge of defense-in-depth principles and network security 
architecture 
 S003—Skill in evaluating the adequacy of security designs 
 S0027—Skill in determining how a security system should work (including its 
resilience and dependability capabilities) and how changes in conditions, 
operations, or the environment will affect these outcomes 
 S0054—Skill in using incident handling methodologies 
What the workforce applies in the workplace is the most important aspect for 
cybersecurity learning. It is the reason for this research pursuit—and the more strategic 
challenge for the entire cybersecurity learning discipline, ahead. 
Problem Statement: This research continues previous work that started with the 
DoD’s cybersecurity strategy and policy. After conducting over 70 cybersecurity workshops 
with various DoD customers, cybersecurity assistance has transitioned to assisting program 
offices with their more chronic cybersecurity risk management challenges instead of a 
program’s acute cybersecurity shortcomings. 
Research Goals:  
 Assist program offices with their commitment to harbor critical learning behaviors 
that support security management and security engineering that may lead to 
essential cybersecurity risk management practices for an evolving cyber threat. 
 Demonstrate that implementing a robust, effective, and sustainable cybersecurity 
program requires a long-term and ongoing commitment and a transition from 
solving a problem to managing a dilemma.  
The researchers posit that the DoD will be hard-pressed to achieve the desired 
mission assurance objectives for security and resilience without recognizing cybersecurity 
risk management, and that the achievement of security engineering critical behaviors must 
predominate at the individual, team, and organizational levels. Implementing a robust, 
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effective, and sustainable cybersecurity risk management program will always be a 
foreboding challenge for program offices. Unlike decades ago, they now have to build 
systems that anticipate and survive a constant evolving cyber threat attack the minute 
systems are fielded, without the luxury of a crystal ball. Over a three and half year period, in 
executing over 70 cybersecurity workshops, DAU has refocused on how to best manage this 
dilemma versus how to solve a problem. The ability to understand this change means that 
learning KSAs need to be viewed and embodied as critical behaviors. In DAU’s 
cybersecurity workshops, learners have the opportunity to practice these behaviors in 
rigorous case studies. Application of these behaviors beyond the classroom and back in 
their workplace is where the transformation begins, or where it can easily end before it 
begins. Without reinforcement, or time to practice, these vitally critical cybersecurity 
behaviors will likely succumb to the forgetting curve and place the systems they support at 
risk.  
Background 
Last year, the authors presented Part 1 and focused on a discussion on 
policy/directives and then explored the efficacy of the DoD’s cybersecurity strategy and 
associated actions taken to date—all intended to safeguard the efficacy of DoD systems. 
The researchers intended to develop a cybersecurity approach customized for DoD 
acquisition organizations that characterized what it takes to implement a robust, effective, 
and sustainable cybersecurity program. This year, Part 2 focuses on the achievement of key 
cybersecurity behaviors to meet that end, including the following: 
 Determining the effectiveness of security controls in support of risk management 
 Evaluating the performance of security controls in support of organizational 
mission assurance objective 
 Justifying security control development and implementation in support of 
organization mission assurance objectives 
 Evaluating security controls at system interfaces and that span system of 
systems  
 Appraising protection of information assets in context of a threat level for 
protected information assets 
In addressing the above behaviors, it has become quite evident that cybersecurity for 
program offices is more of a dilemma than a problem. Program offices have a continual 
need to adapt their security posture over time to a co-evolving intelligent threat. Problems 
usually have solutions that can be applied to correct a risk that materialized (AKA the issue) 
at some point. When a car is broken, a diagnostic tool in the hands of a skilled technician 
can quickly determine the cause and the remedy required to return the car to working order. 
On the other hand, finding peace in the Middle East is a dilemma, and dilemmas cannot be 
solved anywhere near as easily. Instead, they require ongoing vigilance that balances a 
huge and complicated array of competing needs. Given its complexity, cybersecurity is a 
challenge where organizations need to continually test the outer edges of their learning 
envelopes with the understanding that there is no silver bullet. 
To continue to guide this research pursuit, the authors used the same four questions 
to better isolate the learning implementation hurdles currently found in the DoD’s 
Cybersecurity Strategy. The answers continue to be both informative and instructive: 
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1. Have the DoD’s actions (e.g., policy directives, tools, methods, etc.) met the stated 
and implied expectations for cybersecurity protection and resilience? (Updated in 
Part 2) 
The answer is still no. The DoD is vulnerable to crippling cyberattacks by cyber peers 
that could impose significant loss of life, equipment, and ability to execute mission.  
DOT&E’s assessment in their FY2018 annual report to Congress (Behler, 2019) can 
be summarized with the following comments: 
DOD missions and systems remain at risk from adversarial cyber 
operations. Operational tests continued to discover mission-critical 
vulnerabilities [emphasis added] in acquisition programs. (p. 229)  
 
Test and assessments in FY18 again found that low-capability attack 
techniques too often posed a risk for disrupting operational missions 
[emphasis added]. (p. 232) 
The tone of the current DOT&E summary is very similar to previous warnings from 
their annual reports of FY15, FY16, and FY17 (Behler, 2018; Gilmore, 2017; Hall, 2017). 
An uncomplimentary review provided in the March 2019 SECNAV Cybersecurity 
Readiness Review summarizes,  
To restate, the DON culture, processes, structure, and resources are ill-
suited for this new era. The culture is characterized by a lack of 
understanding and appreciation of the threats, and inability to anticipate 
them, and a responsive checklist behavior that values compliance over 
outcomes, antiquated processes and governance structures that are late 
to respond to dynamic threats, and an enterprise whose resources are 
required for warfighting and defense in this environment. The net-net is that 
the DON is preparing to fight tomorrow’s kinetic war, which may or may not 
come, while losing the global cyber enabled information war. (p. 7) 
These results are reinforced by numerous other open source reports from the DNI, 
the OMB, the GAO, the DoDIG, the DSB, the DOT&E, other agency inspector generals, 
RAND Corporation, and numerous others—a cyberattack by an advanced cyber nation 
states could inflict significant mission impact to the DoD and its supporting infrastructure. 
This conclusion can be drawn from at least 100 different reports of cybersecurity 
assessments over the last eight years—a sophisticated cyberattack could inflict significant 
impact to DoD missions, with possibly substantial losses of life, equipment, and supporting 
infrastructure (Coates, 2019). Current risk mitigation strategies are not tightly connected to 
mission assurance imperatives in the face of a growing hostile cyber environment. In 2017, 
a RAND study found that “cybersecurity risk management does not adequately capture the 
impact to operational missions nor is it designed in” (Snyder et al., 2017, p. ix). Snyder et al. 
(2017) went on to say that the policies governing cybersecurity are better suited for simple, 
stable, and predictable environments leading to significant gaps in cybersecurity risk 
management. Without more critical thinking about ongoing risk management of an evolving 
cyber threat, future studies are likely to announce the same conclusion—the DoD is 
vulnerable to crippling cyberattacks by cyber peers that could impose significant loss of life, 
equipment, and ability to execute missions.  
2. What are the metrics and have they been effective?  
The answer is still no. Extensive DoD cyber activities are not achieving measurable 
outcomes of secure and resilient systems. Most DoD metrics measure activity instead of 
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outcomes of systems of system security and resilience. While there are numerous metrics 
that could be cited, the authors believe the following three metrics best sum up DoD 
cybersecurity effectiveness: (1) comments on cyber survivability from DOT&E open source 
annual reports to Congress; (2) the SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review of 
cybersecurity risk with who has the largest Dark Web footprint of stolen sensitive data; and, 
(3) the number of open cybersecurity recommendations for remediation as reported by the 
DoD Inspector General (IG). 
DOT&E Comments From Cyber Tests on Effectiveness 
DOT&E has conducted over a hundred operationally realistic cyber-threat tests over 
the last eight years. Only a few programs during that time achieved cybersecurity 
survivability objectives. In the last two DOT&E open source annual reports to Congress, 
successful ratings included: one instance of “demonstrated a robust cyber network defense 
to protect against an operationally realistic cyber threat opposing force” (Behler, 2018, p. 
130), two instances of “survivable in a cyber-contested environment” (Behler, 2019, pp. 49, 
53), and one instance of “secure against a cyber threat having limited to moderate 
capabilities” (Behler, 2019, p. 15). In this and previous DOT&E open source annual reports 
to Congress, the more frequent ratings are 
 “not survivable in a cyber-contested environment” (Behler, 2019, p. 21),  
 “vulnerabilities identified during earlier testing periods still had not been 
remedied” (Behler, 2019, p. 23),  
 “the system remains vulnerable to cyber-attack” (Behler, 2019, p. 94),  
 “has cybersecurity vulnerabilities that can be exploited” (Behler, 2019, pp. 103, 
105), and/or  
 “cybersecurity testing identified deficiencies” (Behler, 2019, p. 144).  
Please note the above instances with page references are for different systems 
traceable through page references. The issue is less about cybersecurity execution by a 
specific program and more about an ongoing trend of DoD system effectiveness against 
realistic cyber threats.  
DoD Protection of Sensitive Information  
The lack of achieving outcomes is best demonstrated by the loss of classified and 
controlled unclassified information (Nakashima & Sonne, 2018). A recent Wall Street 
Journal article described the armed forces under constant cyber siege by relentless foreign 
actors (Lubold, & Volz, 2019). The loss of sensitive information has a significant effect on 
the Department of Defense (DoD) for lethality and technological superiority (Mattis, 2018). 
Estimates on the value of losses of intellectual property from the United States are up to 
$600 billion (Mattis, 2018). According to the White House, “The United States cannot afford 
to have sensitive government information or systems inadequately secured by contractors. 
Federal contractors provide important services to the United States Government and must 
properly secure the systems through which they provide those services” (Trump, 2018, p. 7). 
The DoD implemented DFARS 252.204-7012 to require contractors to protect unclassified 
sensitive DoD information, defined as Covered Defense Information (CDI), on their 
networks. SECNAV (2019) concluded that “competitors and potential adversaries have 
exploited DON information systems, penetrated its defenses, and stolen massive amounts 
of national security IP. This has lessened our capabilities and lethality, while strengthening 
their offensive and defensive capabilities” (p. 4). The emerging DoD vision sees a shared 
responsibility developing between the DoD and its contractors on the protection of sensitive 
information regardless of its location (DoD, 2018a, 2018b).  
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DFARS 252.204-7012 is now applied to all new contracts and requires contractors to 
protect CDI on their networks. Concerning effectiveness of these activities, the metric that 
the SECNAV used in his Cybersecurity Readiness Assessment is applicable.  
While there are many ways to measure cybersecurity risk, one indicator of 
vulnerability is how much data about an organization is available on the 
Dark Web. When compared to Fortune 500 companies, the US government 
has the largest collective Dark Web footprint. Of the 59 government 
agencies, the DON led the government with the largest Dark Web footprint. 
(SECNAV, 2019, p. 8) 
Of particular concern should be the ability for entities to detect if they are breeched. 
Nine of the 129 security requirements in the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) concern the ability to perform audit of unusual activity on the network. In the redacted 
DoJ, Office of Inspector General report, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber 
Victim Notification Process, dated March 2019, “the FBI had 721 Special Agents dedicated 
to cyber investigations, including cyber victim notifications” (p. 1). Over the period from 
November 2014 to December 2017, “Cyber Guardian had 16,409 cyber incidents and 
20,803 victim notifications” (DoJ, 2019, p. 12). Of special note was another revealing 
comment: “According to FBI personnel, victims of cyber intrusions are typically identified by 
the FBI or its partner agencies in the course of their investigative activities. As a result, many 
cyber victims, most of which are companies or organizations, are unaware that they are 
victims of an intrusion until the FBI notifies them” (DoJ, 2019, p. 1).  
Open DoD Cybersecurity Recommendations for Remediation  
The DoD tends to be a leader in the federal government and not to be forced to 
remediate open cybersecurity recommendations. A DoD Inspector General (IG) redacted 
report (DoDIG, 2019) states that “recently issued cybersecurity reports indicate that the DoD 
still faces challenges in managing cybersecurity risk to its network. Additionally, as of 
September 30, 2018, there were 266 open cybersecurity-related recommendations, dating 
as far back as 2008” (p. 6). As noted in our previous paper, “FISMA requires that each 
Federal agency conduct an annual independent evaluation to determine the effectiveness of 
the agency’s information security program and practices” (DoD IG, 2019, p. 1). Prior 
independent assessment of DoD cybersecurity maturity, using the Cybersecurity Framework 
categories of identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover, tended to rank the DoD at the 
lowest levels of maturity of any federal agency (OMB, 2017). The DoD IG (2019) found that  
the DoD needs to continue focusing on managing cybersecurity activities 
in four of the five NIST Cybersecurity Framework functions—Identify, 
Protect, Detect, and Respond, primarily in the Framework categories of 
governance, asset management, information protection processes and 
procedures, identity management and access control, security continuous 
monitoring, detection processes, and communications. (p. 6) 
3. Is the DoD headed in the right direction?  
The answer is still partly. The DoD has shown a willingness to create policy and 
strategy. Senior leadership has been willing to examine itself in very critical ways. Several 
senior leaders have shown extraordinary vigilance by instituting major initiatives in 
cybersecurity reform including the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development, and Acquisition; and Director, Defense Contracting Management Agency. 
Numerous operational commands are taking positive steps as well with self-reporting and 
taking corrective action. 
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DOT&E performed an assessment of a major command which identified 
several vulnerabilities that could impact mission assurance. Senior 
leadership at the command self-reported to senior DoD leadership that the 
command’s mission assurance posture was potentially degraded, and 
made mitigation of these vulnerabilities a top priority. [emphasis added] 
(Behler, 2019, p. 231) 
Additionally, there have been isolated pockets of excellence within the DoD. The 
Army’s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2 Program Office did an 
exceptional job of becoming a cybersecurity leader and innovator of cybersecurity 
acquisition and operations best practices. The Army’s WIN-T Increment 2 Program Office 
set a high bar. The DoD’s ability to assure senior leadership of mission assurance, in spite 
of a cyber peer threat, can be much higher once acquisition programs “demonstrate they 
have a robust cyber network defense to protect against an operationally realistic cyber 
threat opposing force” (Behler, 2018, p. 130). 
A group with potential to do more for cybersecurity is the DoD Acquisition Workforce. 
However, SECNAV (2019) aptly noted that  
Cybersecurity is largely viewed as an IT issue and is not integrated across 
all operations and activities of the organization. The current approach is 
characterized by vertical stovepipes of responsibility which ignore the 
reality that information and cybersecurity require a horizontal, systems 
approach across all aspects of the organization’s activities and operations. 
This horizontal approach is extremely important for without it, the DoN 
cannot achieve cybersecurity. (p. 7) 
The DoD acquisition workforce would be well-served if it approached cybersecurity 
as a dilemma instead of a problem. To make matters worse, many in the acquisition 
community have either deflected or not fully embraced their role in cybersecurity and the 
need to adapt to the persistent threat. It’s vitally important to elevate the acquisition 
community’s knowledge of cybersecurity risk management through better implementation of 
systems security engineering, the ability to adapt to advancing threats, and integration with 
cyber operations. The acquisition workforce needs to transition from a “compliance 
construct” for cybersecurity to one of cybersecurity for operational “mission assurance.” 
More systems might achieve in operational test adversarial assessments and fulfill 
operational commanders’ mission assurance needs if there was a transition of approach, 
culture, and workforce attitudes.  
The cyber threat is evolving and changing as Snyder et al. (2017) indicated: 
Capabilities of potential adversaries are growing, and the changing 
technologies introduce new vulnerabilities over time. This evolution means 
that static solutions for cybersecurity management are unlikely to be 
effective; cybersecurity solutions need to be adaptive. Creating defensive 
barriers in the form of security overlays that respond to discovered 
vulnerabilities is by nature insufficient to protect against future, unknown 
threat vectors [emphasis added]. (p. 7) 
Actors with the ability to exploit the DoD’s systems are growing at a staggering rate:  
 Recent advances in cyber technologies indicate that automation—and 
even artificial intelligence—are beginning to make profound changes to the 
cyber domain. Warfighters and network defenders must prepare for the 
onslaught of multi-pronged cyberattacks [emphasis added] across both 
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critical mission systems and the multitude of supporting systems and 
networks that enable these missions. (Behler, 2019, p. 229)  
To keep pace with the threat, the DoD acquisition workforce needs to step up their game. 
4.  What industry best practices should the DoD adopt and why?  
There are numerous. Industry best practices have concentrated their efforts on 
resilience, trustworthiness and continual testing. Intel, Google, Microsoft, Netflix, major 
financial institutions, and other cybersecurity leaders have taken an enterprise approach to 
cybersecurity. Their approaches include active engagement of cybersecurity by senior 
leadership and robust workforce cybersecurity involvement. As stated by SECNAV (2019),  
The enterprise approach is not just about the systems and management; it 
also includes robust involvement by the workforce. Many companies simply 
fire personnel, from the C-Suite to the line level, who fail to follow 
established cybersecurity policy and processes. They also have very active 
CEO and CIO/CISO-led Cybersecurity committees and working groups 
that meet on a regular basis which include business unit, technology, risk 
management, and executive leadership. (p. 34) 
Best in class cybersecurity companies have transitioned their security posture 
traditional security activities to emerging security concepts. Their best practices include 
rapid adoption of transformational emerging security technologies (such as for access 
management); extensive monitoring of network and system health, especially for 
configuration management and access management; and extensive and continual testing 
(extensive developmental testing, internal adversarial testing, bug bounties, etc.). 
An example of an industry best practice is the “zero-trust model.” This model was a 
core element of the Army’s WIN-T Increment 2 security posture. SECNAV (2019) described 
the zero-trust architecture as follows: 
With a Zero-Trust model, successful companies have addressed both 
careless behaviors and malicious intent by granting trust only to those who 
have securely proven their identity. Having done so, their subsequent 
access to resources is limited to the least amount of access required. 
Successful Zero-Trust designs include processes that ensure all resources 
are accessed securely, adopt a least-privileged strategy strictly enforcing 
access control, and continuously monitor the enterprise ecosystem. 
Everyone and everything is constantly validated, with zero exemptions. (p. 
36) 
The more mature cybersecurity companies have a wider focus than just system 
protection to that of dynamic performance evaluation. The September 2016 DoD Defense 
Science Board report on cyber defense management recommended 
examining the attack data to determine what is working well, what is not, 
where changes need to be made, and where investment is required to 
better defend against troublesome or emerging threats to move beyond a 
compliance approach towards a more dynamic performance evaluation. (p. 
11)  
These companies have adopted a security posture of adaptability and innovative 
thinking in response to impending cyber threats.  
Will this type of thinking eventually become pervasive in the DoD? There are isolated 
pockets of excellence in the DoD exhibiting the required change of approach, culture, and 
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workforce attitudes to execute these best practices. Such a transition just needs to occur 
across a much wider swath of the acquisition workforce and their DoD contractors in order to 
respond to impending cyber threats. 
Assumptions 
As with any research study, assumptions generally help characterize the research 
constraints as well as the prevailing environmental domain. While strikingly provocative, the 
following (and persistent) assumptions reinforce today’s cybersecurity operating envelope: 
 Cybersecurity is a decaying function—static cybersecurity assures a declining 
security posture.  
 No system is without malware—every system has an inherent vulnerability just 
waiting to be exploited. 
 Organizations rely too much on technology for security and don’t sufficiently 
consider the people and process components. 
 The seemingly most secure system often fails to acknowledge that it can be 
affected by a higher level threat (i.e., any system can be misconfigured). 
 Cybersecurity policy stands at the outcome level; acquisition guidance and 
implementation below the outcome level is subjective (i.e., outcome level is 
typically characterized as “design for the fight”) 
 Most programs undershoot “adequate security”—many operate under a false 
sense of security until they discover they did not sufficiently manage realistic and 
likely operational risks. 
 The DoD may not be proactive enough to exploit its own systems to withstand 
advanced threats.  
 Politics can trump engineering. Systems security engineering is constrained in 
pursuing a preferred solution set due to required integration with legacy 
components and systems, lack of control over interfacing systems, and a 
preference for functionality over security.  
 If user behavior is monitored and proper user behaviors can be enforced, the 
chance to reduce a significant attack surface is increased. Significant benefits for 
good user disciple: cost of implementing an effective security posture is reduced, 
and probability of successful detection and recovery increased. Money is a poor 
substitute for discipline (especially enforced user security behaviors).  
Research Methodology 
The researchers treated the cybersecurity skills captured in the NICE KSAs as the 
basis of the required critical learning behaviors. The researchers wondered what if they 
were treated as static, and not part of continuous process of learning and reinforcement 
(e.g., Monitor, Encourage, Reinforce, and Reward [MERR]). What if the acquisition 
workforce did not learn or retain the critical behaviors? These questions set the stage for 
what could be seen as more deterministic outcomes since 
 Without a strong bridge in the form of metrics between what students learned in 
class (Level II) and what they applied in the workplace (Level III), it is more difficult 
to connect the two, and  
 Without the evidence, organizations would be hard-pressed to confirm the 
resources they allocated to Level II learning gains actual paid off in the workplace.  
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The directorate’s intact teams who attended the workshop also previously committed 
to connecting Level II learning objectives with the Level III critical behaviors. Just as 
importantly, their leadership committed to what Kirkpatrick calls its required drivers (i.e., 
MERR) to assure their Level III achievements (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016, p. 56). 
Without them, a key feedback mechanism would be missing, and accountability 
opportunities would be lost. However, the more important aspect surrounds the abilities and 
attitudes of the learners to apply what they learned in the workshop back on-the-job (i.e., 
Level III that doesn’t atrophy), and what results their learning afforded. Furthermore, what 
will happen and what needs to happen to strengthen the bridge between Learning Level II 
and Learning Level III? The achievement of these Learning Level III critical behaviors 
represents the litmus test. Through a suitable dose of feedback (i.e., MERR), Learning Level 
III critical behaviors and Level IV results are more achievable later. 
The Forgetting Curve  
Closely tied to any learning is the unforgettable “forgetting curve,” originated by 
Herman Ebbinhaus (Murre, 2015). He characterized it in a simple formula: 
R = e^(-t/s), where R = Recall; e = Euler’s constant (2.71); t = time passed; and s = strength 
of memory.  
He proved that about 80% of what we learn we forget in 30 days if there is no reinforcement 
(i.e., “forgetting curve”), and it still holds true today. Why is that important for cybersecurity? 
Aside from remembering and applying the nine framing assumptions originally described in 
this study, and in the context of an ever-evolving functional discipline that is more a dilemma 
than a problem, dismissing it would be a dangerous proposition. MERR is no antidote, but it 
certainly keeps the affected individuals’ consciousness on high alert, and rightfully so. 
Cybersecurity Workshop Structure  
To build greater cybersecurity knowledge and raise awareness for acquisition 
professionals, DAU conducted various workshops for diverse audiences. Figure 1 depicts 





Figure 1. Customer Composition in Workshops 
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The critical questions for these workshops have been: Will DAU’s cybersecurity 
workshop enable the individual to develop a competence (either a tactic, technique, 
protocol, or procedure) or behavior that will enable an organizational outcome? Will the 
organization make a commitment in monitoring, encouraging, reinforcing, and rewarding to 
achieve learning gains in the workplace? Possibly the most successful of our cybersecurity 
workshops has been a series of three workshops over multiple days. Figure 2 covers the 
essence of the three workshops—NIST Systems Security Engineering, Threat-Based 
Engineering, and Active Cyber Defense. These workshops were designed to help the 
participants understand security principles, cyber threat and their tactics, and integration of 
acquisition with cyber operations. The compilation of these workshops addresses the 
horizontal issues brought up by SECNAV (2019). The SECNAV (2019) well understood that 
cybersecurity requires “a horizontal, systems approach across all aspects of the 




Figure 2. Types of Cybersecurity Workshops 
The NIST Systems Security Engineering (SSE) uses the NIST 800-160 (Vol. 1 & 2) 
to cover the standards and constructs of system trustworthiness and system resilience. The 
NIST SSE workshop was designed to give the participants time to apply best practices 
outlined in NIST publications 800-160 (Vol. 1 & 2; Ross, McEvilley, & Oren, 2017; Ross et 
al., 2018). Three core behaviors are taught and practiced in the NIST SSE workshop: 
 Construct a comprehensive and holistic system view while addressing 
stakeholder security and risk concerns; 
 Apply input to analyses of alternatives and to requirements, engineering, and risk 
trade-off analyses to achieve a cost-effective security architectural design for 
protections that enable mission/business success; and  
 Evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of the security elements of the system 
as an enabler to mission/business success. 
NIST has done an exceptional job of understanding standards and techniques and 
developing a core process in each of the various volumes. For example, Ross et al. (2017) 
state,  
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The ultimate objective is to address security issues from a stakeholder 
requirements and protection needs perspective and to use established 
engineering processes to ensure that such requirements and needs are 
addressed with the appropriate fidelity and rigor across the entire life cycle 
of the system. (p. viii) 
For system security engineering trustworthiness, our desired outcome is to develop 
and demonstrate the evidence necessary to support assurance claims and to substantiate 
the determination that the system is sufficiently trustworthy. Ross et al. (2018) note that “the 
ultimate objective is to obtain trustworthy secure systems that are fully capable of supporting 
critical missions and business operations while protecting stakeholder assets, and to do so 
with a level of assurance that is consistent with the risk tolerance of those stakeholders” (p. 
ix). For system security resiliency, the desired outcome is focused on designing security risk 
management activities, producing related security risk management information, and 
advising the engineering team and key stakeholders on the security-relevant impact of 
threats and vulnerabilities to the mission/business supported by the system. 
This is the pre-course email sent to the workshop participants: 
You will do a capstone case study as part of a team for either system 
trustworthiness or system resiliency. While we have case studies for you 
to work on—if you should desire to nominate a project that you are working 
on as either a trustworthiness or resiliency exercise—we will accommodate 
it. The only caveat is that the training is being executed in Unclassified 
spaces. We have done other DoD systems as exercises (either 
trustworthiness or resiliency) in previous SSE workshop sessions in 
unclassified spaces. Please talk to me on day 1 with your proposal. I 
suspect there is a high probability that we can figure out how to make it 
work. 
The participants nominate a problem they have in their environment. The goal is to 
help participants understand how to implement the standards and techniques to achieve an 
outcome through a series of exercises and case studies. The capstone exercise validates 
whether their system is trustworthy and resilient.  
In the NIST SSE workshops, participants raised the following issues that they felt 
have limited their ability to execute a particular security standard and/or resilience 
technique: 
 Can I change the design/architecture? 
 Can I change configuration? 
 Ability to manage interfaces? 
 Can I contain/isolate/segment trust relations? 
 Can I implement new processes? 
 Can I automate a process? 
 How will I monitor & enforce user behavior? 
 Can I trade off/restrict functionality? 
 What capability will a newer technology provide (will my users be able to 
implement the technology)? 
The fact that these types of questions are occurring in the workshop case studies is 
very encouraging. The next step is to follow up with the workshop participants to ensure the 
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behaviors of construct, apply, and evaluate are underway at their workplaces. There’s no 
guarantee that the learners will have enough opportunities to apply everything they learned 
in the workshop. What needs to happen in the workplace to combat the likely consequences 
of forgetting curve? Without a coach or mentor, how do they get to the point where they 
sustain the cognitive connection to the original learning behavior—and how do we measure 
it? The workplace has to establish surrogate scenarios that refresh and reinforce the critical 
learning behaviors—and what tools are the most appropriate. 
Results and Findings 
Individuals enter the workshops with a wide variance of cybersecurity experience 
and knowledge levels—novice to experienced practitioner. There seems to be several 
revelations that occur during a workshop that would likely increase the chance that a student 
will apply appropriate risk management and security engineering constructs and behaviors 
to their situation after the conclusion of a workshop. Students progress through the following 
stages: understanding cybersecurity is a severe security threat; acknowledging the cyber 
threat is not static, but evolving; accepting that their system/program needs to do something 
about evolving cyber threats; adapting their cybersecurity security posture if the cyber threat 
changes; committing to cybersecurity risk management as a continual, ongoing effort; and 
becoming an effective agent of change to achieve meaningful outcomes. Depending on the 
maturity of the student and their organization, individual progression can stop at any point in 
the cycle of progression. During these workshops, the following common themes surface: 
 Workshop participants usually start the workshops looking for prescriptive 
answers. They hope to find a fix to their cybersecurity problem. 
 The initial focus is frequently satisfying some external entity. The most common 
DoD focus is to satisfy an Authorizing Official (AO). More advanced programs will 
set a goal of succeeding against a capable adversarial assessment sponsored by 
a DoD Operational Test Agency (OTA). While both are worthy objectives, their 
real focus should be one of mission assurance.  
 Often, they are not creating a solution set that can adapt if the threat should 
change. Most want to stop after finding a single possible solution, instead of 
creating a solution set. 
 They want to make the threat static and then optimize to a static threat. 
Accepting an evolving threat is a significant strain on people and resources. 
 They need to achieve a construct of self-assessment and continual testing—such 
that achievement of either an ATO/ATC or passing an OTA assessment—are 
just part of an ongoing process for cyber risk management to achieve mission 
assurance.  
The core question simply stated became “What initial successes will likely occur as 
you consistently apply what you learned?” In the researchers’ Part 1 of this study, we 
examined the Western Naval Audit Service in learning and applying critical cybersecurity 
behaviors from our workshops. This particular group was highly motivated and had 
committed leadership. Kirkpatrick calls it having required drivers (i.e., monitor, encourage, 
reinforce, and rewards) to assure their Level III achievements (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 
2016, p. 56). Since their initial series of cybersecurity workshops, this group offered to the 
SECNAV’s office to bid for a cybersecurity audit. The SECNAV assigned Western Naval 
Audit Service a critical audit issue concerning fleet cybersecurity readiness. This audit is 
underway and should be back to the SECNAV’s office for review before the end of 2019. To 
go from no cybersecurity audit experience to conducting a major fleet readiness 
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cybersecurity audit review was a major commitment by this group and the start of objective 
measurable outcomes in the form of secure and resilient systems.  
Across multiple workshops, we have seen statistically significant changes in attitudes 
towards the behaviors. The following qualitative comments across various workshops 
summarize the trend seen across the workshops.  
 Participant 1—Right now, as a novice, I would say my biggest challenges are 
ensuring I have a full and complete understanding of all the components, and 
having a clear vision of putting all this into play …  
 Participant 2—The biggest challenge is simply a matter of scope vs. resources. 
We all face this of course, so finding time to keep momentum requires focus that 
is sometimes difficult.  
 Participant 3—I was impressed that the training was compressed into two days. 
So much material was covered! … I think that improvement will come from 
continuing the activity so it is not a one and done … 
 Participant 4—This workshop helped me better understand the requirements and 
how to convey that importance to our customers …  
 Participant 5—When looking at the security posture of an asset, I will now ask 
the questions to determine what the priority result is for this asset and then look 
at the systems needed to attain that goal/result. …  
 Participant 6—I’m standing up a lab for a new C2P effort. … It is aimed at 
replacing the legacy C2P over the next decade. I expect to apply the techniques 
learned in this workshop during our IPTs … 
 Participant 7—This course has made me more important as a resource to others 
around me. … Already, leaving the class, was able to connect to a resource in 
the Cloud Broker to the O(ffice)365 Broker … 
From the above comments, the described student progression can be seen. These 
participants are starting to understand cybersecurity is a severe security threat, 
acknowledging the cyber threat is evolving, accepting their responsibility to do something, 
adapting their cybersecurity security posture, and committing to ongoing cybersecurity risk 
management. If these participants receive reinforcement from their organization, there is a 
significant probability for meaningful outcomes to occur. If we can start to have more of the 
acquisition workforce to exhibit the same types of attitudes – our operational forces might 
have a chance against when facing a cyber peer.  
Conclusion 
The number of cyber threat actors who have the ability to exploit the DoD’s systems 
is growing at a staggering rate while too many people involved in the acquisition community 
may not have fully embraced (or even understand) their role in cybersecurity. It’s vitally 
important to elevate the acquisition community’s knowledge of all cybersecurity risks in order 
to more carefully plan, decide, and act for inescapable and impending cybersecurity threats. 
Admittedly, the danger signs are very telling, and they’re not good.  
In Part 2 of this research project, the authors reinforced how behaviors learned in 
workshops could be instituted in a participant’s work environment. The researchers posit 
that the DoD will be hard-pressed to achieve the desired mission assurance objectives for 
security and resilience without recognizing that (1) cybersecurity risk management and 
security engineering critical learning behaviors require commitment at all levels—individual, 
team, and organizational; and (2) cybersecurity is a domain that must be viewed as a 
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dilemma where there is no one-size-fits-all solution, nor can it be treated as a static problem. 
Cybersecurity threats will never wane in frequency or severity. Its asymmetric nature is too 
great. Without constant vigilance, the United States will lose the cybersecurity war.  
Thankfully, the commitment from numerous senior DoD leaders is growing. Outside 
the DoD, there has been a willingness from numerous organizational leaders (e.g., the 
intelligence community, DOT&E, IG, audit service, chartered boards, think tanks, etc.) to 
take similar action. And programs like the WIN-T Increment 2 Program Office have 
demonstrated what it takes to achieve cybersecurity excellence at a given juncture. If the 
remaining acquisition workforce steps up to the cybersecurity learning challenge, the 
negative trends discussed at the beginning of the paper might just start to reverse course, 
resulting in a much more favorable heading. 
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